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1959]

RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY UNDER

THE BANKRUPTCY AcT-EMPLOYER'S

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNION

WELFARE FUND NOT

ENTITLED TO STATUS OF WAGES.

United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc. (U.S. 1959)
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the trustees of a union welfare fund
sought, pursuant to section 64 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act,' to assert
a second priority for unpaid contributions due the fund from the bankrupt
Embassy Restaurant to the extent of the amounts which had accrued
during the three months preceding the bankruptcy. The claim was based
upon a collective bargaining agreement which obligated the bankrupt to
contribute eight dollars per month to the fund for each employee. The
priority was granted by the court of appeals but disallowed by the Supreme Court, which held, with three Justices dissenting, that such contributions were not wages within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act
and, therefore, were not entitled to the priority accorded wages due to
workmen. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 554
(1959).2
Under Section 64 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act wages due to workmen are accorded second priority in bankruptcy proceedings.8 It has
been held that vacation pay, 4 severance pay,5 back pay awards under
NLRB decisions 6 and portal to portal pay7 fall within this category of
"wages", thus entitling them to priority, provided the other requirements
of the Bankruptcy Act are met. However, priority has been denied for
amounts which the employer has withheld to be kept by him temporarily,
pursuant to an agreement with the employee,8 and for awards under a
1.30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (2) (1952) provides:
"(a) The debts to have priority, . . . and the order of payment shall be
(2) wages not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned
within three months before the date of commencement of the proceeding, due
to workmen ... "
2. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 554 (1959).
3. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (2) (1952).
4. In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (but only to the extent
earned within the three months immediately preceeding bankruptcy).
5. McClosky v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Dep't of Industrial Relations, Cal., 200 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1952).
6. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 334 U.S. 25 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
7. See Kavanas v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1948) (dictum).
8. McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119 (1936); In re Flick, 105 F. Supp. 503
(S.D. Ohio 1900).

(589)
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state workman's compensation proceeding. 9 The lower federal courts have
split on the question of granting priority to claims for the employer's
contribution to union welfare funds. 10 Those courts granting the priority
treat these contributions as just another method of paying compensation
for services rendered or, in effect, additional wages, pointing out similar
interpretations of the term "wages" under other federal statutes." Where
the priority has been denied, it has been on the basis that the indefinite,
contingent and prospective receipt of benefits from the fund is not within
12
the meaning of wages as contemplated by the draftsmen of the act.
These latter courts also point out that the contributions are not owed
directly to the employee and that the employee has no rights in the fund.'3
However, the contributions of employees to a voluntary plan of disability
insurance, which had been deducted from their pay and taken with a
14
private insurance company, have been accorded the priority of wages.
Since wages are often defined as the agreed compensation for services rendered,' 5 the Court in the instant case might well have decided,
without doing violence to the language of the Bankruptcy Act, that the
employer's contributions to the union welfare fund fell within this definition and thus, were entitled to the priority sought. The Court, however,
looked to the purpose of the act, in rejecting this definition in favor of
one more in keeping with the intent of Congress, viz., whether payment
of the obligation would "alleviate in some degree the hardship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their families." 10 As the Court
points out: "these payments owed . . . to the trustees rather than to the

workman, offer no support to the workman in periods of financial distress." 17 It would seem the mere fact that the debt was owed or payable
to one other than the workman would not alone be determinative,' 8 but
rather it is the support factor which appears to be controlling. While the
Court does not spell out what is meant by "support", it is significant
that the Court, in deciding that these contributions did not offer the
requisite support to the distressed workman, placed much emphasis, as do
the lower courts which deny priority, upon the nature of the union welfare fund, the absolute control exercised over it by its trustees and the
consequent lack of certainty that the workman would ever receive any
benefit from the fund if and when needed. The nature of the benefits which
the fund purported to give, i.e., life insurance, weekly sickness benefits
9. In re Raiken, 33 F. Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1940) (award not earned wages).
10. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 554, 558 n.1 (1959).
11. In re Otto, 146 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
12. In the Matter of Sleep Products, Inc. 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See
text at note 20.
13. In re Brassel, 135 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955).
14. In re Ross, 117 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
15. In re Gurewitz, 121 Fed. 982 (2d Cir. 1903).
16. 79 Sup. Ct. 554, 556 (1959).
17. Id. at 557.
18. See Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 U.S. 186 (1907); In re Ross,
117 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
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and hospital and surgical benefits, was not discussed and thus it would
be reasonable to conclude that contributions for such benefits could fall
within the concept of support. 19 Therefore, it is arguable that the holding
in the instant case would not preclude a finding that an employer's contributions to such a fund were wages within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act where the fund was so organized that a court could feel assured
that the fund would, in fact and not just in name, offer support to the
workman by providing such benefits.2 0 On the other hand, a contract
designating the contributions to be wages and a subsequent assignment
thereof to the trustees, would not necessarily compel a finding of priority
where the benefit to the workman from the assigned portion of his wages
was, as in the instant case, illusory or indefinite and thus would not serve
to alleviate the hardships of unemployment. To allow such a fund to
share equally with the workman would be contrary to the spirit of the
Bankruptcy Act, especially in cases where the employer's assets are insufficient to pay all in the second priority.
Herbert H. Brown

CONFLICT OF

LAWS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIM'S ACT-WHETHER

LIABILITY IS DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE
OF THE INJURY OR THE LAW OF THE PLACE
OF THE NEGLIGENT ACT.

Hess v. United States (9th, Cir. 1958)
The deceased was drowned when the tug on which he was employed
was overturned as a result of the turbulent condition of the waters in the
Bonneville Dam. The turbulent condition of the waters was caused by
the operation of the spillway gates, which operation was performed by
the government employees on the dam. The tug was owned by an independent contractor who was hired by the United States to repair the dam.
The administrator contended that under the Federal Tort Claims Act,'
19. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that none of the courts have
indicated that the purpose of the act would dictate that priority only be granted
where it would result in cash payments to the workman. Also it would seem
that the value of having such benefits available to the workman would overshadow
the fact that they might never actually be realized.
20. It is interesting to speculate whether the Court would distinguish the
situation where the application of the proceeds would afford protection to the
workman subsequent to the bankruptcy from the situation where the proceeds would
be used merely to pay for past protection and have no appreciable effect on the
benefits to which the worker was then entitled. The real question here seems to
be whether the Court is looking at the,obligation when incurred or at the time of the
bankruptcy.
1. 60 STAT. 843, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952).
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the United States is liable according to the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred and, since the dam on which the act causing
2
the injury is part of Oregon, the Oregon Employer's Liability Act should
apply. The district court held that under the FTCA, the law of the
place where the injury occurred should apply, and, since the injury took
place on navigable waters, the general maritime law should apply, under
which the United States would not be liable.3 The court further reasoned
that even if the law of the place where the act occurred were applied,
that law includes the conflicts law of Oregon, under which the law of the
place where the injury occurred, i.e., general maritime law, should apply.
4
Hess v. United States, 225 F.2d 285 (9th. Cir. 1958).
Under section 1346 (b) of the Federal Torts Claims Act, the United
States is liable according to "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 5 Where the negligent act and the injury both occur within a
given state, all courts agree that governmental liability must be determined
according to the law of that state.6 Similarly, where the act and injury
occur in separate states, the conflict of laws rule generally applied in suits
between private parties is that the law of the place of injury governs the
rights of the parties.7 However, a dispute has developed among the federal courts as to the application of this section when the government is
the defendant and the negligent act and the injury take place in different
states.8 In United States v. Union Trust Co.,9 the court held that under
this section the United States is liable according to the law of the place
of the negligent act. Some of the other federal courts would also strictly
construe other statutes that permit suit against the United States. 10 The
court in United States v. MarshaUll interpreted section 1346 (b) liberally,
finding that the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred"
refers to the law of the place 'of the injury. The court reasoned that Congress was referring to the place where the negligence, either of the act or
omission, became operative, directly causing the injury and not the place
where the negligence occurred but was then inoperative.' 2 Assuming, however, that the proper interpretation of section 1346 (b) is that the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred should be applied, the federal
2. ORR. Rrv. STAT. § 654.305 (1953).
3. The court applied the Oregon Wrongful Death statute as a constitutional
supplement of the maritime law and decided in favor of the government since it
could find no negligence by any of its employees.
4. Hess v. United States, 225 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1958).
5. See supra note 1.
6. See San Felice v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Scott
v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ga. 1957).
7. Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948);
Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953).
8. United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Contra,
United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956).
9. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
10. Bryan v. United States, 99 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1938).
11. 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956).
12. Id. at 187.
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.courts are then confronted with the problem of what that law is: the whole
law or the internal law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
The court in the Union Trust Co. case did not consider this problem and
merely applied the internal law of Virginia, i.e., the place where the negligent act or omission occurred. 13 Virginia courts would not have applied
Virginia law because the Virginia conflicts rule states that the liability
14
of the parties is to be determined according to the place of the injury.
However, the court in Landon v. United States 5 suggested that "the law
of the place where the act ...

occurred" refers to the whole law, including

the conflict of laws rules, of the place of the act.
The legislative history of the FTCA indicates that the drafters of
the act did not consider the problem of multi-state torts when they chose
the language of section 1346 (b). 1 This legislative history plus the ambiguity of the language of the section when applied to multi-state torts
would seem to negate any implication that the section was intended to
vary from the existing conflicts rule in multi-state tort situations that
the law of the situs of the injury controls. Furthermore, since the FTCA
relinquishes the immunity of the sovereign from suit, the act should receive a liberal construction in view of its benevolent purpose.' 7 Of course,
under either interpretation of section 1346 (b), the result in the instant
case would have been the same since the court would have applied the
whole law of Oregon under which the general maritime law would have
been applied. The same result would be reached in most other similar
situations if the whole law of the particular state were applied.18 The reason for the present conflict among the federal courts is that the court in
the Union Trust Co. case applied only the internal law of the situs of the
act or omission, when by the whole law of that place, the law of the situs
of the injury should have been applied. It may be assumed that if Congress did not contemplate the multi-state tort situation when it chose the
language of section 1346 (b), it did not consider whether the whole law
or merely the internal law of the state should apply. Yet, if the whole
law were not applied, the general purpose of Congress to have the state
apply its own law to suits against the United States exactly as it would'
to suits between private individuals, would be thwarted.' 9 The application
of the whole law of the state would have the advantage of not only executing the general design of Congress in enacting the FTCA, but would
13. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
14. Atlantic Coast Line v. Withers, 192 Va. 493, 65 S.E.2d 654 (1951) ; Baise v.
Warren, 158 Va. 505, 164 S.E. 655 (1932).
15. 197 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1952).
16. See S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
17. Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); O'Toole v. United
States, 206 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1953).
18. When the whole law of the state is applied, the only time the law of the
situs of the injury would not apply would be where the federal court would interpret section 1346 (b) as referring to the law of the situs of the act or omission
and the conflicts rule of that particular state would also apply the law of the
situs of the act or omission.
19. See supra note 17.
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allow the federal courts to follow the commands of divergent rules of
statutory construction on the question of whether section 1346 (b) refers
to the law of the situs of the injury or to the law of the situs of the act,
without changing the result in the particular case.
Edward J. O'Malley

CONFLICT OF LAWS-RELEASE-EFFECT

OF RELEASE DETERMINED

BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF THE TORT.

DeBono v. Bittner (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1958)
Following an automobile accident in Virginia involving the parties
to this action and other persons, the plaintiff executed general releases
to a third party, such releases containing customary reservation of rights
against others than the party released. Both plaintiff and defendant are
residents of New York. In this action for personal injuries suffered in
the accident, the Supreme Court of New York granted defendant's motion
to dismiss holding that since the defense of release is a matter of substance
going to the right of plaintiff to maintain a tort action, the law of Virginia
should apply to the tort arising in Virginia, and, under Virginia law, the
general releases were absolute and released all parties despite the reservation. DeBono v. Bittner, 13 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup.
Ct. 1958). 1
When a conflict of laws problem arises in a tort situation most courts
apply the law of the situs of the tort, reasoning that the right of action
is created by the jurisdiction in which the tort occurs; and, to insure
uniformity of enforcement of that right, all defenses should be governed
by the law of that jurisdiction no matter where the plaintiff may bring
the action. 2 When the conflicts situation arises because of a release having
been signed in a different state than that in which the tort occurred, the
law of the forum has seldom been applied. The law of the situs of the
tort is generally applied to determine the effect of the release whether
the forum is the place of the tort,3 the place where the release is executedor a third jurisdiction not connected with either event. 5 Only occasionally,
when the lex loci delicti is contrary to the public policy of the forum, has
the law of the forum been chosen. 6 Although this rule is usually applied
only to the creation of causes of action, 7 it has been applied to the effect
1. DeBono v. Bittner, 13 Misc. 2d 333, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
2. See 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICTS or LAWS §§ 378.1-78.2, 388.1 (1935) ; GOODRICH,
CONFLICT or LAWS § 92 (1949) ; MINOR, CONFLICT or LAWS §§ 196-97 (1901).

3. Preine v. Freeman, 112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1953).
4. Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 19 N.E. 539 (1918).
5. Lindsay v. Chicago B. &Q. R.R., 226 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1915); Goldstein v.
Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942). See also Western Newspaper Union
v. WOODWARD, 133 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
6. HANcOcK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT or LAWS 84 (1942).

7. See, e.g., Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943) ; Hudson
v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927).
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to be given to a release in at least one instance. 8 A minority of courts,
while applying the lex loci delicti to determine the effect to be given the
tortious acts, have applied the lex loci contractus in determining the construction to be given the release. 9 In a recent New York case in the Appellate Division, 10 it was held that the effect to be given a release executed in New York by New York parties was to be determined by New
York law even though the tort was committed in Oregon, on the theory
that New York was the state which had the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute. If the court in the instant case had followed
the same approach, it would have applied the law of New York which
interprets releases containing reservation clauses as covenants not to sue,
which covenants are not available to those not a party to the agreement."
In adopting a choice of law rules, the courts generally try to balance
the desire for uniformity and certainty of result 12 with the desire for
sufficient flexibility to provide for the proper result in extraordinary
cases. 1 3 In the instant case the court emphasized the former and thereby
disregarded the intent of the parties as to what law should govern the
effect of a release executed in New York. Such an approach has often been
criticized as arbitrary where the conflicts problem is not merely one involving a choice between the lex fori and the lex loci delicti, but one where
14
the elements of the tort are distributed among several jurisdictions.
Since under the approach used by the court in the instant case, the lex loci
contractus would apply if the situation were one involving only contractual
relationships, 15 it would seem more consistent to apply the law of Virginia to the legal relevance of the tortious act and the law of New York
8. Kent v. Hair, 60 Ga. App. 652, 4 S.E.2d 703 (1939) (where construction of a
release according to the lex loci delicti would not be applied by the Georgia court
as being contrary to the public policy of Georgia).
9. The Adour, 21 F.2d 858 (D. Md. 1927) (semble); Leach v. Mason Valley
Mines Co., 40 Nev. 143, 161 Pac. 513 (1916).
10. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d
587, motion for leave to appeal granted, 6 App. Div. 2d 1016, 178 N.Y.S.2d 623
.(2d Dep't 1958).
11. Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903) ; Shaw v. Crissey, 182
Misc. 27, 43 N.Y.S.2d 237 (County Ct. 1943).
12. See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 4, 8; Cheatham, American Theories of
Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Their Utility, 58 HARV. L. Rgv. 361, 379 (1945).
See also CARDOZO, THe PARADOXES or LEGAL

SCIENCE

67-68 (1928)

for an opinion on

the need for certainty and uniformity in the conflict of laws: "The walls of the
compartments must be firm, the lines of demarcation plain, or there will be overlappings and encroachments with incongruities and clashes. . . . [T]he finality
of the rule is in itself a jural end."
13. See CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BAStS OF TH8 CONFLICT or LAws 340-41
(1929). See also Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. Rzv. 361 (1945), showing a development of the cyclical pattern
of choice of law rules from the statutory rigidity of the continental system, through
the flexible comity theory of Story, the return to uniformity in the vested rights

theory of Beale and Holmes, and its answer in the more flexible local law theory of
Cook and Hand.
14. COOK, op. cit. supra note 13 at 313; HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 6 at 35-36;
Cheatham, supra note 13 at 379-85; Morris, The Proper Law of Tort, 64 HARV. L.
Rtv. 881, 884 (1951).
15. See COOK, op. cit. supra note 13 at 347-52.
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to the effect to be given the release.' 6 While this approach would provide
a more just result in the instant case, it might still be criticized as being
arbitrary where the parties, though executing the release in one state,
clearly intended the law of another to govern its effect: Although some
courts reason that they can only apply the law of the place where they
sit, they will, however, impose an obligation under that law "as nearly
homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurs." 17
The purpose of this approach is to allow a more flexible treatment of the
matter by considering business convenience and fairness of the result.18
Because such questions as agency, capacity of parties and charitable immunity are not always logically decided by the jurisdiction in which the
tort occurred, 19 the most rational choice of law rule would allow a breaking down of the ultimate question of liability, and a choice of the par20
ticular law which has the closest connection with the particular problem.
The New York Court of Appeals has adopted a similar approach in contract cases, 2' and it seems that there should be at least as much room
for flexibility in choice of law rules in the tort area where there is less
need for predicting liability prior to the' tortious act, than in commercial
situations where more certainty is demanded. 22 Whatever approach may
be utilized, it would seem to be a valid conclusion that a rule is unsound
which compels the application of a particular law as the only proper one
without further consideration of other relevant factors, 23 which in the
instant case would include the expectancies of the parties to the release.
Joseph I. Mahon, Jr.
16. Such has not been the result. The lex loci delicti has been applied to the
effect to be given the release by the line of cases followed by the instant court for no
better reason than the "contract by its terms is tied to the tort." Smith v. Atchinson,
T. & S. F. Ry., 194 Fed. 79 (8th Cir. 1912).
17. Guiness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 768, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Judge Hand) af'd
sub nom. Hicks v. Guiness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925).
18. COOK, op. cit. supra note 14, at 340-41. See Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822, 823 (1950) where it is stated that the local law
theory's star is on the ascendant.
19. Cf. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d
587, motion for leave to appeal granted, 6 App. Div. 2d 1016, 178 N.Y.S.2d 623
(2d Dep't 1958) (action between New York parties for injuries resulting from a
tort occurring in Oregon, where, although it was held that the effect to be given
a release executed in New York was to be determined by New York law because
New York was the state which had the most significant contacts with the matter
in dispute, it was held further that the question of whether defendant was to be
afforded charitable immunity was to be determined by the law of Oregon).
20. See Morris, The Proper Law of Tort, 64 HARv. L. Rpv. 881 (1951).
21. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954) which would
give to ". . . the place having the most interest in the problem paramount control
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the
forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the
outcome of the particular litigation."
22. Morris, supra note 20, at 883 & n.13.
23. See COOK, op. cit. supra note 14, at 340-41; Cavers, The Choice of Law
Problem, 47 HARV. L. Riv. 173, 180, where he refers to a rule as being a blindfold
test which does not consider what the lex loci is until after it is decided that it will
apply.
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JURISDICTION-FOREIGN

CORPORATION

DOING BUSINESS-FEDERAL

INTERPRETATION OF STATE LAW.

Shoultz v. Revolvator Co. (E.D. Pa. 1959)
Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based on diversity
of citizenship, to recover for personal injuries allegedly caused by a defective elevator sold by defendant, a New Jersey corporation, through its
Pennsylvania sales representative. This particular representative, though
closing no contracts on behalf of defendant, produced one-third of defendant's revenue. Since the elevator had also been serviced by agents sent
directly from defendant's offices in New Jersey, plaintiff contended that
defendant was doing business in Pennsylvania and was thereby subject
to service through the Secretary of the Commonwealth, pursuant to section 1011(B) of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law,' as made
applicable by rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The district court, however, granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding,
that the law of Pennsylvania, which governs this question, requires the
sales agent to have the power to bind his principal on a contract in order
that the principal be held to be doing business within the state, and that,
therefore, there was no proper service of process upon the defendant in
the instant case. Shoultz v. Revolvator Co., 140 Legal Intelligencer No. 40,
3
p. 1, col. 1 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 1959).
In 1907 the Supreme Court of the United States held that before
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation could be asserted by service upon
its agent within the jurisdiction, the corporation had to be doing business
therein to such an extent as to warrant the inference that, through its
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1011(b) (1958).
2. Rule 4(d) provides "....
7.... it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served . . . in
the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which service is made. .."
Where service is made under this section the state interpretation of doing
business is applied, the function of the federal court in such a case being to
determine first, whether the state's provision for exercising jurisdiction over
the foreign corporation has been met in the particular circumstances of the case
and second, whether this provision satisfies the constitutional requirements
of the due process clause. See Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st
Cir. 1948). Where service is made under Rule 4(d) (3), the federal provision
for service on a foreign corporation, there is a conflict of authority as to whether
state law or general federal law is to determine what is doing business. See
Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., supra. (including concurring opinion of
Biggs, C.J.) ; Pike v. New England Greyhound Lines, 93 F. Supp. 669 (C. Miss.
1950) ; see also Note, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 508, 521-24, applying the outcome test of
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945): "[I]n all cases where
a federal court is exercising jurisdiction because of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in Federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would
be tried in a state court."
3. Shoultz v. Revolvator Co., 140 Legal Intelligencer No. 40, p. 1, col. 1 (3d Cir.
Mar. 6, 1959).
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agents, it was present in the jurisdiction. 4 Since that time, it has been
widely held that mere solicitation of orders by an agent does not amount
to doing business so as to make the corporation amenable to process. 5 After
Erie R.R. v. TompkinsO the role of the Supreme Court was largely that of
setting limits within which state provisions for service upon foreign corporations would satisfy due process requirements. Thus in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,7 the Supreme Court held that due process requirements
are satisfied as long as the provisions for acquiring jurisdiction do not
violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice", and therefore, the presence of the corporation within the territory of the forum
was no longer necessary in order for it to be amenable to process, provided
the corporation had "certain minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction.
A somewhat more restrictive view was adopted by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Lutz v. Foster & Kester8 which held that solicitation of
orders by an agent is not enough to make a foreign corporation amenable
to service through its agent, unless that agent has atithority to bind the
corporation to a contract. After this decision, the Pennsylvania legislature passed section 1011(C) 9 of the Business Corporation Law which,
in Florio v. Powder Power Tool Co.,10 was held to have divorced Pennsyl4. Green v. Chicago, B.&Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).

5. Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 579 (1914); Case v. Smith,
Linaweaver & Co., 152 Fed. 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1907): Shambe v. Delaware & H. R.R.,
288 Pa. 240, 135 At. 755 (1927); Pittsburgh & Shawnut Coal Co. v. State of New
York, 118 Misc. 50, 192 N.Y. Supp. 310 (Ct. Cl. 1922).
6. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), which held that the federal courts in diversity
cases were to apply ". . . the law of the state . . . declared by its legislature or
by its highest court in a decision." See "outcome test" clarification of this rule,

supra note 2.
7. 326. U.S. 310 (1945).
8. 367 Pa. 125, 79 A.2d 222 (1951).
9. Doing business was defined as ". . . the entry of any corporation into this
Commonwealth for the doing of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby

realizing pecuniary benefits or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single

act in this Commonwealth for such purpose with the intent of thereby initiating a
series of such acts . . ." This statute followed the trend of liberal statutes which
followed the International Shoe Co. decision. See MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, § 88(d)
(1951) (corporation is amenable to jurisdiction if tort is committed or contract made),
applied and upheld. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Wheel Corp., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D.
Md. 1950) (tort), Compagnia De Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107
A.2d 357 (contract) ; N.Y. INs. LAW § 59-2 (2) (a) (1949) (corporation is amenable
to jurisdiction on delivery of insurance policy), applied and upheld, Zacharakis v.
Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (1952) (corporation is amenable to jurisdiction on delivery of insurance policy), applied and upheld, Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp.
(corporation is
896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-319(4) (1955)
amenable to jurisdiction on doing any act whatsoever in state), applied and upheld
in Schutt v. Commercial Traveler's Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956);
(corporation is amenable to jurisdiction on committing
VT. STAT. § 1562 (1947)
tort or any part thereof), applied and upheld, Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,
116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). VA. CoDE ANN. § 13-139 (1950) (corporation is
amenable to jurisdiction on advertising securities), upheld Travelers Health Ass'n.
v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
10. 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957). There were no Pennsylvania Supreme Court
interpretations of section 1011(C). The following county court cases are the only
Pennsylvania cases dealing with the section: Ramey v. Donora So. R.R., 37 Wash.
70 (C.P. Pa. 1956) which is in accord with the decision of Florio v. Powder Power
Tool Co., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957). Ciere v. Dante Importing Co., 54 Lack.
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vania from the doctrine of the Lutz case. However, in the 1957 amendments to the Business Corporation Law section 1011(C) was omitted"
and the court in the instant case then revived the Lutz doctrine as the
Pennsylvania statement of the law on the definition of doing business
2
within the state.'
Since, by statute, mere use of Pennsylvania highways renders an
out-of-state motorist liable to service of process through the Secretary
of the Commonwealth t3 it seems anomalous that a foreign corporation
can avoid service in Pennsylvania, where it solicits one-third of its business and directly services its products, by merely withholding from its
agents the authority to close contracts. Such a rule seems especially
questionable in tort cases where, unlike contract situations, the plaintiff
has not chosen to deal with an out-of-state corporation, and in many
instances is financially unable to bring suit in a foreign jurisdiction.',4
Therefore, the question arises in the instant case, whether the court can
provide the protection to which the plaintiff seems entitled. Despite holdings that, in the absence of statutes, federal courts in diversity cases are
bound to follow decisions of the highest court of the state in which they
sit, 15 it has been urged that a person should have just as much opportunity
to argue for a change in existing law before the federal court as he would
have before the state supreme court, 16 in order to grant every litigant,
whether in a state or federal court, the right to be part of the evolution
33 (C.P. Pa. 1955) and Creval v. Duquense Motor Coach Lines, 103 Pgh. L.J. 124
(C.P. Pa. 1955) both applied the Lutz doctrine despite section 1011(C).
11. Pa. Laws 1957, act 370, § 1011(C). Section 1011(B) providing for service
to Secretary of the Commonwealth has been retained by the 1957 amendments.
12. Accord, Lolli v. Mack Truck Inc., 170 F. Supp. 671 -(E.D. Pa. 1950),
although in that case it seems that the corporation would not even have met the
definition of section 1011(C).
As to the basis for applying the Pennsylvania interpretation of doing business
to this problem see Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
It would appear that before the legislature defined doing business in § 1011(C),
the district court rejected the application of state law to this problem not only
where service was made under federal provisions but even where service was
made under rule 4(d) (7). Compare Fiorella v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 850
(E.D. Pa. 1950) with Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa.
1951).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1201 (a) (b) (1958 Supp.). This type provision
has been constitutionally upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
14. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, 668 (1951) (". . . the
probabilities are that the witnesses will be readily available, and the law of the
state where the act is done will control the consequences of the act.")
15. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941). Cf. Gettins
v. United States Life Ins. Co., 221 F.2d 782 (1955) and McLouth Steel Corp. v.
Mesta Mach. Co., 214 F.2d 608 (1954), both of which held the federal courts
bound by intermediate state courts even though the court may think the rule
wrong or that the highest court of the state would reach a contrary result.
16. See Note. How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HARV. L. Rev.
1299, 1301 (1946). See also Clark, State Law in Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 291-95 (1946); Corbin, The
Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 776 (1941) ; Keefe, Gilhooley, Baily
and Day. Weary Erie, 34 CORNSLL L.Q. 494, 514-20 (1949).
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of the law and to have justice administered in his particular case.1 Recent
acceptance of this reasoning is evidenced by opinions approving federal
courts' disregard of outdated state supreme court decisions in favor of
later dicta' 8 and even other less explicit indicia of how the state court
would decide the case involved.' 9 However, this rationale, even if considered wise, would not be appropriate in the instant decision since the
Lutz doctrine is only eight years old and was written after the liberal
International Shoe Co. case and, therefore, cannot be considered outdated
20
Furnor conceived without full knowledge of constitutional allowances.
thermore, the legislature, in omitting the definition of doing business and
in not providing a substitute must be presumed to have meant the preexisting case law to govern. 2 1 Additionally, the plaintiff's day in court
in the instant case is not being sacrificed since the granting of the motion
to dismiss is not res judicata as to the merits of the case.

Joseph J. Mahon, Jr.

FOR FAILURE
PROVIDE ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION TO AN INFORMER.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT-TORTS-LIABILITY

To

Shuster v. City of New York (N.Y. 1958)
Plaintiff's intestate, Arnold Shuster, supplied information to the Police
Department of the City of New York which lead to the arrest of a notorious criminal. Shuster's part in the arrest was highly publicized and
he received communications threatening his life. For a time the police
department provided Shuster with special protection. This was later
withdrawn, and the police, assuring Shuster that the threatening messages
came from crackpots and cranks, declined to provide further special protection. Shortly thereafter, Shuster, while walking on a public street at
night, was killed by an unknown assassin. Plaintiff, as administrator of
the deceased's estate, brought this action against the city alleging that
17. Corbin, supra note 16, at 776: "Conflict with the past is to be preferred over
conflict with the future."
18. See Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F. 2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957)

allowing the federal court to disregard a twenty eight year old state supreme court decision in favor of later dicta.
(dictum)
19. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956)
which would seem to allow federal courts to use other data than merely state court
holdings in deciding how the supreme court of the state would rule.
20. See Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
21. Plaintiff contended that the omission was inadvertant citing a report of a
committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association. It is doubtful whether any court
would take it upon itself to correct such an error even if it were of the opinion that
there was an error.
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the city failed to furnish the deceased with the protection demanded by
the situation. The court of appeals, with three justices dissenting, reversed the decision of the appellate division which had upheld the dismissal
of the complaint by the trial court, holding that the public (acting in this
instance through the City of New York) owes a special duty to use reasonable care for the protection of persons who collaborate with it in the
arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that such
persons are in danger due to their collaboration. Shuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).1
It is axiomatic that there can be no liability for negligence in the
absence of a breach of duty owed to the person injured. Where affirmative action is involved it is the act which defines the duty but in cases
of non-action there must be a pre-existing duty which compels action, a
failure to so act being a breach of that duty. 2 This pre-existing duty will
arise from conduct which "has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit,
but positively or actively in working an injury. . . ." 3 Thus -when a municipal corporation assumes the task of providing police protection thereby
inducing its citizens to rely upon such protection and forego the use of
other means of securing their safety, there arises the duty of performing
this task with appropriate care. 4 This should be distinguished from the
situation where the municipal corporation has been given the power to
provide police protection but decides not to exercise this power thereby
depriving its citizens of a benefit.5 Thus in theory the City of New York,
having assumed the burden of providing such protection would be liable
for injuries resulting from its failure to meet the requisite standard of
care concomitant with the duty which arose upon the assumption of the
burden. However, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity the municipality is generally held to be immune from liability for injuries resulting
from negligence in the performance of a governmental function such as
the furnishing of police and fire protection.0 In New York this immunity
has been waived by statute, subjecting the municipality to liability" in
accordance with the same rules of law as apply to actions . . . against individuals or corporations." 7 Thus the municipality has been held liable
where injuries resulted from its failure to fire a policeman when his
1. Shuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).

2. Non-action in face of duty to act is more accurately
feasance as opposed to non-feasance for which there is no
common law. Cf., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247
896 (1928).
3. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160,
898 (1928).

described as misliability under the
N.Y. 160, 159 N.E.
167, 159 N.E. 896,

4. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. Rev.

20, 39 (1939).
5. Cf., Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
aff'd per curiam sub noma.United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955);

2

HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1625 (1956).
6. 18 McQUIILIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

7. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (1939).

§§ 53.51, 53.52 (3d ed. 1950).
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dangerous tendencies were known,8 and from its failure to use reasonable
-care in training a police officer." Liability has also been imposed for the
negligent failure to provide proper medical attention to a prisoner,' 0 and
for the city's failure to abate a nuisance." However, when it has been
alleged that the plaintiff has been injured merely as a result of the municipality's negligent failure to provide adequate police 12 or fire protection, 1 3
the complaints have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action;
the duty to so provide being a duty owed to the members of the public
collectively and importing no liability to individuals for the breach thereof.
Heretofore, the court, under Section Eight of the Court of Claims
Act, has exposed the city to liability for non-action in the performance
of a governmental function only where the particular duty to act was one
which a corporation would have had under the same fact situation;14
and where there was a clear and affirmative assumption of a duty which
required the municipality, or an individual under the same circumstances,
to act. 15 In cases where the act required by the duty is one peculiarly
governmental in nature, the court, fearful of imposing a crushing obligation on the municipality which might not have been intended by the legislature, has required that there be a legislative mandate that the specific
act in question be performed, before finding a duty to so act.' 6 The instant
case would seem to create a new test for determining the duty of a municipality. The test is not whether a corporation would be required to so
act, or whether the legislature commands that the municipality so act, but
now whether there should be liability under general tort principles. Such
a test would appear to include the imposition of liability for non-action
in the face of a duty to act; the existence of such a duty being similarly
determined by reference to general tort principles without regard to
precedents established while the municipality was still immune. Thus it
may be argued that the facts of the instant case merely present one situation where, in the face of forseeable harm to the plaintiff, the police
fail to use the degree of care commensurate with the circumstances and
required by the duty which the municipality assumes when it actively
undertakes to provide its citizens with police protection.' 7 This would
8. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 64 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
9. Meistinsky v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d
Dep't 1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
10. Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952).
11. Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d
Dep't 1953). However, the cross-complaint of the City against the owners of
the property was allowed. Runkel v. Holmesky, 286 App. Div. 1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d
729 (2d Dep't 1955). Cf. Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
12. Murrian v. Wilson Line, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st
Dep't 1946), aft'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947) ; King v. City of New York,
3 Misc. 2d 241, 152 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Kings County Ct. 1956).
13. Steitz v. City of Bacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
14. See text at notes 8 and 9 supra.
15. See text at note 10 supra.
16. Compare cases cited at note 11 supra. with those cited at notes 12 and 13 supra.
17. See Shuster v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778,
785, 786 (2d Dep't 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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seem to be a sounder basis for the holding; the theory of a correlative
governmental duty to provide special protection for informers being, undoubtedly, a consequence of the court's balancing of its desire to facilitate
cooperation between the citizenry and law enforcement officers, and its
fear of imposing a crushing financial burden upon the municipality, by subjecting it to liability under a broad principle. The result is desirable in
that the right of informers to reasonable police protection might counterbalance the fear of reprisals which have intimidated public-spirited citizens,
and thereby deterred them from rendering invaluable aid to the police.
Furthermore, since the plaintiff must prove facts from which a reasonable
man could believe that the police failed to act as reasonable police would
under the circumstances in order to get to the jury, it is doubtful that
many recoveries will be had; especially since the "well-known fact"' 8 that
few persons are harmed by reason of collaboration with the police would
seem to be strong evidence that the care which the police do use in such
situations is reasonable. Thus it is not likely that the decision in the instant
case, viewed narrowly, has imposed any crushing burden on the municipality. On the other hand, this case, in effect, destroys the last bastion
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in New York and conceivably opens
up a new area for judicial exploration. It is not improbable that, absent
legislation, the municipality may ultimately be held to a duty to act merely
where it was forseeable that its citizens would reasonably rely upon its
so acting.
Herbert H. Brown

PROPERTY-RIGHTs OF PRIVATU LANDOWNERS TO RAINFALLINJUNCTION AGAINST CLOUD 'SEDING.

Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
The defendant corporation was hired by a -large number of farmers
to engage in cloud seeding activity to suppress the formation of hail
which frequently ravaged their lands. Plaintiffs, a group of ranchers in
an adjoining county, initiated proceedings to enjoin defendant from seeding clouds by artificial nucleation over their lands, offering evidence that the
seeding activity had reduced the natural rainfall on their lands. The
district court granted a temporary injunction pending a final hearing
from which defendant appealed. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in
affirming, held that the evidence sustained the finding that clouds were
destroyed over the property of plaintiffs by the seeding operations and the
18. Shuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 94, 154 N.E.2d 534, 545 (1958).
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subsequent reduction in rainfall was an interference wi
aintiffs' property rights, which would cause irreparable damage if not'-estrained. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959). 1
In order to assert a property right in movables, such as wild animals,
there must be an occupancy, involving an act of control.2 Some objects
cannot be privately owned because they are physically beyond control,
such as running water, when it is on the land of upper riparian owners. 3
However, it has been held that a landowner can have rights in such
elements 4 which will be protected from any unreasonable interference 5 on
the grounds that the owner is entitled to the use of his own property in its
natural condition, including the water flowing thereon.6 Some jurisdictions
have adopted a "trespass" theory in regard to the infringement of riparian
rights, and hold that any diminution of the stream gives rise to an immediate cause of action because of the possibility of prescriptive rights
arising. 7 In other jurisdictions,8 a riparian owner can not prevent the use
of water by another riparian owner unless he can show that the use was
unreasonable and thereby deprived him of a beneficial use. The cases on
support of land" and rights to drainage to property 10 are based on the
same concept, i. e., that the landowner has a right to the beneficial use of
his land in its natural condition. This right, however, is qualified by the
correlative right of every other ripairan owner to use water for the
development and improvement of his land, and when these uses conflict, the
one with the greater social utility will be given preference.
It would seem to follow from the basic principles of property law as
developed in the support and riparian rights cases, that all forms of natural
precipitation should be elements of the natural condition of land and
as such constitute one of the rights which the courts will protect as
essential to the use and enjoyment of land. However, in Slutsky v. City of
New York," the one reported case prior to the instant case to consider this
question, the court held plaintiffs' suit defective, "since they clearly have no
vested property rights in the clouds or the moisture therein."'1 2 It should be
1. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
2. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 40 (perm. ed. 1939).
3. McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489 (1906);
Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 280 Pa. 492, 124 Atl. 747 (1924).
4. Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913);
Tracey Dev. Co. v. People, 212 N.Y. 488, 106 N.E. 330 (1914).
5.Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co., 82 Minn.
505, 85 N.W. 520 (1901).
6. Duckworth v. Watsonville Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 Pac. 338 (1907) ; See Note, 1
STAN. L. Rv. 43, 54 (1948).
7. New York Rubber Co. v. Rothery, 132 N.Y. 293, 30 N.E. 841 (1892).

8. Gitlas v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891); Rigney v. Tacoma Light
Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147 (1894).
9. Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 141 Atl. 609 (1928).
10. Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930).
11. 97 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
12. Id. at 239.
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noted, however, that the court further stated that it must "balance the conflicting interest between the remote possibility of inconvenience to plaintiffs'
resort and its guests, with the problem of maintaining and supplying New
York City . . . with an adequate supply of pure wholesome water." 13
Furthermore, although a landowner has no property rights in the clouds
or the moisture therein, it does not necessarily follow that he has no
rights whatsoever to the benefits which will accrue to him from normal
rainfall. The holding in the instant case recognizes this property right to
natural rainfall, but the court expressly stated that the injunction to
protect such rights would issue only for an interference with clouds over
plaintiffs' own property, thus, in effect adopting a theory of trespass. It
is submitted that such an approach would be unworkable in many cases
due to the difficulty of proving that the dissipation of clouds took place
over a given parcel of land. If the courts were to adopt a theory analogous
to the reasonable use doctrine of riparian rights, a landowner would not
have to prove the injury occurred while the clouds were over his land,
for, as in the case of a running stream, it would be sufficient grounds for
injunction to prove an unreasonable depletion, even though it occurred
"up stream," so to speak. In addition, cases such as the Slutsky case could
be rationalized, since a determination of what is a reasonable depletion would
be a matter of public policy as measured in terms of social benefit.
William B. Colsey, III

ZONING-MNICIPAL

GOVERNMENT-EXCLUSION

OF CHURCHES FROM

AREA ZONED RESIDENTIAL.

CongregationTemple Israelv. City of Creve Coeur (Mo. 1959)
Plaintiff, having been refused a permit to build a temple on its property,
brought this action to have certain ordinances of defendant city declared
void and to enjoin the defendant from enforcing them. A prior ordinance1
had allowed churches in the area in question but two weeks after plaintiff
had contracted for the purchase of the land, a petition was made to the
zoning board for amendment of the zoning ordinance. The plaintiff
proved that its deed was executed three weeks after the petition and three
13. Id. at 240. See 34 MARQ. L. Rzv. 262, 264 (1950), for a criticism of this
case.
1. The city had in effect a comprehensive zoning ordinance which divided the
city into six use districts; A, B, C, and D were single family dwelling districts, with
different lot sizes, E was a multiple dwelling district and F was a commercial
district. Relating to the A district, article IV, section 2-2 provided that churches
are permitted but only when off-street parking space is provided upon the lot or
within one hundred feet thereof, which space is adequate to accomodate one car
for every eight persons for which seating is provided in the main auditorium of
the church and exclusive of the seating capacity of Sunday School and other special
rooms. Plaintiff's plans would comply with these requirements.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 4
VILLANOVA

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 4

weeks before the ordinance was amended to exclude churches from the
area.2 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the enabling act8 which
gave municipalities the power to enact zoning ordinances regulating the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, gave them no power to prohibit either churches
or schools in residential districts. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of
4
Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959).
5
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. the Supreme Court of
the United States first declared zoning laws constitutional, but it has
never ruled upon their validity when they prohibit churches in residential
districts. 6 State courts, however, generally hold restrictions on the location of churches invalid.7 Such decisions are usually not based on freedom
of religion as applied to the states under the fourteenth amendment, but
rather on deprivation of property without due process of the law,8 denial
2. Ordinance 104 repealed all authorization for churches in any district in the
city. Ordinance 105 provided that on written application for such use, the application should be forwarded to the City Zoning and Planning Commission whose duty
it should be to investigate, consider and make a written report thereon to the Board
of Aldermen. It then provided for a public hearing and that upon conclusion the
Board of Aldermen could issue a special permit, provided however, that in case of a
protest against the granting of said application duly signed and acknowledged by
the owners of ten per cent or more of the area . . . such permit shall not be issued
except by the favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Board of
Aldermen.
3. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 89.020 (1949).
4. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.
Sup. Ct. 1959).
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. But see Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed,
338 U.S. 805 (1949), where for lack of a substantial federal question, the Supreme
Court denied an appeal from a case which upheld a zoning ordinance prohibiting
churches in a residential area.
7. E;g., Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27 So. 2d 561 (1946)
Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945). Those'courts which uphold
such ordinances, hold that they are a reasonable exercise of the police power and
beneficial to public health, welfare and morals. City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist
Church, 108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587 (1951); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949); West Hartford
Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
8. Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27 So. 2d 561 (1946);
State ex rel. Tampa, Florida Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Tampa, 48 So.
2d 78 (Fla. 1950); Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d
583 (1939); Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308
(1952) ; State ex rel. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90
P.2d 217 (1939) ; Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton,
1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956) ; Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445,
136 N.E.2d 488 (1956) ; North Shore Unitarian Society, Inc. v. Village of Plandome,
200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; State ex rel. Synod of Ohio of
United Lutheran Church of America v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515
(1942) ; Young Israel Org. of Cleveland v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, 133 N.E.2d
174 (1956); Congregation Adath Jeshurum v. Cheltenham Township, 70 Mont.
345 (C.P. Pa. 1954) ; City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415
(1944); Congregation Committee of North Fort Worth Congregation Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956);
State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee,
50 Wash. 2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957).
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of equal protection of the law9 or the statute is so construed as to permit
the use. 10 Those courts which find that such statutes violate the due
process clause argue that the exclusion of churches from residential districts is not a proper exercise of the police power because it has no reasonable relation to the protection of public health, welfare and morals." On
the other hand, the decisions of some courts seem to imply that there
would be no deprivation of property without due process of law if the
elimination of traffic congestion or other reasonable regulative purposes
12
outweighed the interest in freedom of religion in. a particular situation.
The courts invoking the equal protection argument hold that such zoning
ordinances are arbitrary when considered in light of similar uses, such
as hospitals, schools and colleges, allowed by the ordinance in the area,
and that therefore these ordinances deny the complaining church the
equal protection of the laws."3 In order to avoid excluding-churches under
a zoning ordinance which prohibited buildings of a substantially different
type or size, it was held that the only purpose of the ordinance was to
exclude business property and therefore the ordinance did not apply to
churches. 14 Where a zoning ordinance allowed churches to be built in a residential district only where all the church property was surrounded by
streets or alleys, a church was allowed to comply with the statute by
dedicating the necessary thoroughfares from it's own property. 15 Where
an ordinance forbade a school with living quarters attached, and a church
wanted to erect a school and convent, it was held that these did not constitute a school with living quarters attached.' The decision in the instant
case extends the construction placed on the statute considered in State ex rel.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Feriss17 where the court in applying the rule
of ejusdem generis held that the enabling act allowing regulation of location for trade, industry, residence or other purposes applied only to
9. Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); Roman Catholic
Welfare Corp. of San Francisco v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 325, 289 P.2d 438
(1955).
10. Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27 So. 2d 561 (1946);
O'Brien v. Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952) ; Bd. of Zoning Appeals
v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948).
11. See note 8 supra. Some courts hold that there is also a deprivation of
property without due process of law when zoning boards arbitrarily refuse to issue
to a church a building or use permit which could be issued under a valid permissive
use ordinance. State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio
App. 89, 133 N.E.2d 174 (1956); Congregation Adath Jeshurum v. Cheltenham
Township, 70 Mont. 345 (C.P. Pa. 1954) ; State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957).
12. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948) ;
City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. .115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944) ; State ex rel.
Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d
378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957). Compare Congregation Committee of North Fort Worth
Congregation Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27 So. 2d 561 (1946).
15. O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952).
16. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1948).
17. 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1957).
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private and not public purposes, and therefore could not be applied to
public schools which were expressly authorized by the state constitution and
statute. In applying this holding to the principal case, the court said that
in view of the prohibition against restraints on freedom of religion in the
federal constitution, which is a stronger constitutional provision than the
state's provision relating to schools, the holding in the Feriss case should
be extended to make prohibitions of churches invalid. 18
The decision in the principal case falls into the narrow and difficult
field, where one must distinguish between public aid to religion and
sectarian education, and those public acts which abridge the free practice
thereof. The case holds that to forbid the erection of a church is an
abridgment of freedom of religion. However, the reasoning the court
borrows from its earlier decision in the Ferris case, that this is a public
as distinguished from a private function, seems inapt, because the operation
of sectarian schools and churches is something forbidden to the state.
Nevertheless, there is a neutral ground in which the state may operate, as
in permitting the incorporation of such institutions, and granting tax
exemption, and other privileges and immunities to them. It would appear
to go too far, however, to say that the state may not exclude all churches
or private schools from certain areas, where the requirements of public
health, safety and welfare are concerned. It is important therefore, in
supervising the administration of churches, to realize that the instant case
could have better been decided on the grounds that the arbitrary manner
in which the zoning ordinance was amended was a denial of equal protection of the law.
John G. Hall
18. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 454
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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